Buffalo to remain in place until 2027

24 November 2025 – Will President Ramaphosa resign before 2027? Who do ANC supporters want to succeed Cyril Ramaphosa? What did Vice Admiral Monde Lobese say about South Africa’s maritime security capabilities? Why did President Trump decide to lift some reciprocal tariffs? Is South Africa at risk of higher inflation in 2026?

Buffalo to remain in place until 2027

President Cyril Ramaphosa will remain in his position as country and African National Congress (ANC) leader until the 2027 party elective conference. This is the CRA’s assessment of the balance of forces within the party, now favouring some measure of stability, predictability, and “safe hands”.

Following initial reporting in Sunday World, speculation increased last week that Mr Ramaphosa was on his way out, that the party’s National Executive Committee would be disbanded, and that a national task team led by former president Thabo Mbeki would take the reins. During the latest party leadership meeting, Mr Ramaphosa is said to have “dared” any doubters in his leadership to challenge him directly. Deputy President Paul Mashatile remains the frontrunner to take over in 2027.

The ANC is facing further electoral decline in the next Local Government Elections (LGEs). This pressure will come to bear on its patronage networks, as the CRA has highlighted this year, but especially on the party leadership in the form of Mr Ramaphosa. Along with the G20 Presidency, the Government of National Unity’s (GNU) continued existence and success are viewed by Mr Ramaphosa as the main pillars of his legacy.

Although retaining Mr Ramaphosa at the party and government helms will please markets and superficially boost South Africa’s investment appeal, the risk is that substantive policy and legislative reforms remain on the backburner, as commodities cycles boost government revenue and mask the country’s lack of strong growth fundamentals.

DA strengthening in opinion polling

A new opinion poll by the Social Research Foundation (SRF), covering 1,002 registered voters and providing a 4% margin of error, finds that Mr Ramaphosa remains the most favourably viewed politician, at 38%. He is followed by Democratic Alliance (DA) federal chairperson Helen Zille at 29% and party leader John Steenhuisen at 26%. uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK) leader Jacob Zuma scored 21%.

Regarding the ANC’s 2027 leadership race, 23% of respondents backed Patrice Motsepe to succeed Mr Ramaphosa, with 19% opting for party secretary-general Fikile Mbalula, and 13% for Mr Mashatile.

On party support, based on a 52.8% turnout model the ANC received 37%, followed by the DA on 32%. No other party registered higher than 10%. MK scored 8%, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) 7%, and the Inkatha Freedom Party, 6%.

With the next LGEs set to be fiercely contested, especially in Johannesburg, 60% of respondents said they supported Helen Zille for mayor. 90% of DA voters supported her; 50% of ANC voters; 41% of EFF voters; and 41% of MK voters. Of black respondents, 51% supported Ms Zille’s candidacy; 87% of coloured respondents; 66% of Indian respondents; and 84% of white respondents.

The ANC’s brand and credibility continue their downward trajectory. Of those surveyed, 73% linked the ANC with the phrase “broken promises”, versus 3% for the DA, and 63% believed the party cares only about itself, versus 10% for the DA.

Confidence in the GNU is weakening somewhat: 52% of respondents indicated they believed the government would succeed, versus 32% expecting it to fail.

Politicians and generals at loggerheads

The Chief of the South African Navy, Vice Admiral Monde Lobese, used the recent SA Navy Gala Dinner to issue a stark warning about South Africa’s deteriorating maritime security capabilities. He argued that chronic underfunding had left the Navy without enough serviceable ships and submarines, resulting in long absences from sea.

According to Admiral Lobese, this gap directly benefitted drug traffickers, illegal traders and human-trafficking networks operating across the Indian and Atlantic routes. His Kenyan and Philippine counterparts recently reported intercepting large drug consignments from East Asia destined for southern Africa.

Admiral Lobese suggested that South Africa was a primary target and questioned whether sustained defunding might be influenced by criminal networks or be part of an agenda to weaken state defence in favour of future privatised security interests. He warned that this steady erosion of capability threatened national sovereignty, economic stability and the long-term safety of citizens.

Through a formal media statement, the Department of Defence described Admiral Lobese’s comments as inappropriate and disingenuous, arguing that they cast unfair suspicion on government leadership at a time when defence funding issues were already being addressed within the department and in Parliament. The statement emphasised that Admiral Lobese’s views did not reflect official policy.

There are deep divisions between the chiefs and the defence minister, Angie Motshekga; military leaders do not see her as someone who understands their issues. The Chief of the Navy’s remarks show that he is willing to go over his superior’s head to lambast Treasury over underfunding.

The military is in no position to conduct any sort of coup. All combat ready equipment is kept at the Combat Training Centre Lohatla, in the Northern Cape, about as far as it could possibly be from the Union Buildings and Parliament. However, there is growing discontent within the rank and file with political leadership, and the top echelons have thus far been unable to address it effectively. A recent morale survey conducted by the department showed a decline in overall morale.

Some tariff relief for SA farmers

President Donald Trump scaled back parts of his April tariff order, a move driven by the realisation that blanket duties would lift food prices for US consumers, damaging the Trump administration’s prospects ahead of the 2026 midterm elections as the question of “affordability” shifts into political focus. Should US domestic food prices stabilise, this duty reprieve could be temporary.

South African farmers benefit modestly. Oranges, macadamia nuts, and certain fruit juices now fall outside the tariff schedule, presenting relief for a small group of South African agricultural exporters. South Africa took advantage of the announced tariffs pause in Q2:2025 and pushed a 26% year-on-year increase in agricultural exports to the US, as firms front-loaded shipments ahead of the duties being reinstated.

Overall, most products remain exposed to tariffs. Table grapes, wine, or ostrich products did not make the exemption list. The 30% duty on non-agricultural goods is unchanged. The expiry of the African Growth and Opportunity Act has added additional tariffs that protected several products for the past 25 years.

South African exporters who benefit from this new list of exemptions should remain wary of a return to higher tariffs. Given the antagonism evidenced between the US and South Africa over the G20 summit, there is little chance that the tariffs will be reduced and a slight possibility that they might be increased.

Rate cuts risk overshadowing weak fundamentals

A fourth interest rate cut this year by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) – by 25 basis points (bps) – will boost short-term consumer and household spending. The latest cut brings this easing cycle in 2025 to a total of 100 bps worth of cuts. But weak structural fundamentals still in play risk short-circuiting South Africa’s recent positive fiscal and growth sentiment.

An inconsistent and more expensive electricity monopoly, underperforming ports and rail, and endemic crime and corruption, make doing business and investing riskier. On the policy and legislation front, the government’s preference remains weighted towards expropriation without compensation and more aggressive black-economic empowerment initiatives.

Depending on the direction of travel of supply-side drivers of higher prices, consumer price inflation could well tread an upward route through 2026. These drivers include administered prices, the international oil price, supply chains tightening, and Rand weakness. In this scenario a typically hawkish SARB would feel encouraged to either cease rate cuts, or more likely increase rates again, to press inflation down towards its new 3% target.

If South Africa’s latest, short-lived spurt of growth proves to be only cyclical – on the back of rising commodities prices in 2025 – businesses will still need to contend with average low growth and stubborn inflation through the second half of the decade.