DA edges ANC in latest poll

14 April 2025 - Has the VAT issue cost the ANC its status as SA's largest party? Will the DA leave the GNU? What is driving higher policy uncertainty in SA? Is Trump’s tariff tsunami working?

Welcome to the weekly Risk Alert from the Centre for Risk Analysis — 14 April 2025

DA edges ANC in latest poll

The latest CRA polling, the results of which were received last week, found higher support for the Democratic Alliance (DA), at 30.3%, than the African National Congress (ANC), at 29.7%. To our knowledge, this is the first time that another party has polled higher than the ANC. The survey among registered voters was conducted from 27 March to 3 April, as the value added tax (VAT) battle was heating up. The sample size was 807 and the margin of error was ±4%. The support levels were not modelled for turnout.

Support dropped for parties voting for the VAT increase, while those opposing it saw their support go up. Among the parties favouring a VAT increase, the ANC is down 10.5pts compared to its 2024 election result, (from 40.2% to 29.7%), the IFP down 2.2pts (from 3.9% to 1.7%), and the Patriotic Alliance down 0.4pts (from 2.1% to 1.7%).

By contrast, among the parties opposing the VAT increase, the DA is up 8.5pts (from 21.8% to 30.3%), the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party is up 1.3pts (14.6% to 15.9%), and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) are up 0.7pts (from 9.5% to 10.2%). ActionSA, which played an ambiguous role in the tax hike, is up 1.7pts (from 1.2% to 2.9%). Although the margin of error means that the percentages for the smaller parties are highly uncertain, the consistency in the direction of movement as it relates to support for a tax increase is significant.

Also significant is that electoral support for the ANC is becoming anchored in the 30% to 40% range. The party obtained 40% of the vote in the May 2024 election. Its raw support reading, not modelled for turnout, was 30% in polling done by the Social Research Foundation (SRF) in February, 41% in a Brenthurst Foundation poll conducted in February/March, and now 30% in the April CRA poll.

Concerningly for the ANC, its support appears to be propped up by the popularity of President Cyril Ramaphosa, who has the highest net favourability score of any South African politician. When the SRF asked respondents which party they would vote for if Mr Ramaphosa was no longer president, having been removed in a motion of no confidence, support for the ANC dropped to 21%, while that for the DA rose to 28%.

More ANC voters are becoming disillusioned with the party over elevated tensions in the Government of National Unity (GNU) and its failure to deliver tangible improvements in living conditions. In the long-term view, support for the ANC has moved from 69% in the 2004 election, to 57% in 2019, to 40% in 2024, with polling in 2025 showing no reversal in the trend. For the party to recover, it will have to use its influence in the GNU to introduce meaningful economic reforms that will spark economic growth, while getting the buy-in of its GNU partners.

The GNU still enjoys broad public support, with 58.3% of respondents preferring it over the previous ANC-only government. That is down slightly from the 62.9% support measured in the CRA’s October 2024 polling. In the Brenthurst Foundation’s polling, the GNU had a higher net favourability score than any political party, at -1%, and a higher net favourability than Mr Ramaphosa, the country’s most popular politician at -2%. In the same poll, 57% of respondents thought the GNU was performing well, while 60% thought it was doing better than the previous ANC-only government.

But while the GNU remains popular, there has been a shift in how different versions of a GNU are viewed. In the most up-to-date CRA polling, support for the current GNU version — which includes the DA and excludes the MK Party and the EFF — registered at 48.5%, a 3.3pt decline from 51.8% in October 2024 CRA polling.

Significantly, support for a version in which the MK Party or the EFF are included, and the DA excluded, has risen to 38.6% — 12pts up from 26.6% in October. In our assessment this means that while voters remain invested in the idea of a GNU, they are becoming restless because the current constellation has not shown enough action. The inclusion of the MK Party or EFF would presumably stir things up.

ANC decides not to decide

The ANC’s shifting positions in the budget conflict reflect internal dissent within the party. At issue is whether the DA should be retained in the GNU or not. One grouping, with Deputy President Paul Mashatile at the front, has become more openly hostile to the DA’s continued role in the GNU. Last Monday, Mr Mashatile said: “They did not vote for it [the budget], but I can see that some of them are still working as ministers. I would be ashamed to do that, because where does the budget come from? You run to work as a minister, but you didn’t vote for the budget, you think it’s OK?”

These internal differences are coalescing around individuals who will contest the 2027 ANC leadership race, among whom Mr Mashatile will be a strong contender. The other camp, oriented on the party’s secretary-general, Fikile Mbalula, and backed by Mr Ramaphosa, wants to retain the DA in the GNU but reset the terms of engagement to ensure the DA falls into line with ANC policy and governance. Despite the current tensions in working with the DA, alternative configurations of the GNU potentially create greater risks and difficulties. But while the ANC dithers, the voters are growing restless.

Uncertainty index rises

The Policy Uncertainty Index (PUI) from the North-West University Business School rose significantly in the first quarter of 2025, to 78.6 from 65.7 in the previous quarter. A value above 50 indicates heightened policy uncertainty, with readings below 50 suggesting reduced uncertainty.

GNU instability and budget uncertainty, along with erratic and disruptive United States (US) trade policy, have raised fiscal concerns and led to currency depreciation. The Rand was trading at R17.41 to the US Dollar on 5 November 2024, Election Day in the US. By 11 April it had fallen to R19.12 to the Dollar. A weaker Rand makes imported goods more costly, including fuel, feeding inflation. The 0.5 percentage point VAT hike, set to be implemented on 1 May, will also make life for South Africans more expensive.

The World Bank optimistically forecasts South Africa’s economy to grow at 1.8% in 2025. With the population growth rate typically averaging 1.3%, only a marginal improvement in GDP per capita will be achieved. Such low growth is also insufficient to address the country’s pressing fiscal challenges, including high debt-service costs and other structural expenditures.

Trump’s tariff rollercoaster

US President Donald Trump is keeping the trade tariff rollercoaster running. As previously reported, having first imposed a 10% tariff across the board, he added a variable tariff determined by the size of the US goods trade deficit on top of that — 31% in the case of South Africa. Last week, Mr Trump announced a 90-day reprieve on the variable tariffs, giving US trading partners a window to negotiate trade deals with the US. The 10% universal tariffs remain in place, as do 25% tariffs on autos, certain goods from Canada and Mexico, and on steel and aluminium.

China has been singled out for special treatment. In a series of tit-for-tat tariff hikes, China raised its rate on US imports to 125%, while the US raised the rate on imports from China to 145%. These numbers could change again at short notice.

In a statement on Wednesday, Mr Trump said that most countries threatened with high reciprocal tariffs had not, “at my strong suggestion, retaliated in any way, shape, or form.” Instead, 70 countries had reportedly approached the US to negotiate economic deals.

If Mr Trump’s intention was to break down resistance to US economic power and bring the world’s nations to Washington’s doorstep to negotiate, with a clear understanding of who was in charge — all while isolating China — early appearances are that the plan is working. However, US actions have been highly disruptive, and the costs could be high, including, for example, a US and global economic recession as well as a breakdown in trust between the US and the world’s trading nations.