DA hot on the ANC’s heels

26 January 2026 — What does new polling suggest regarding the DA’s national support, and Helen Zille’s candidacy for mayor of Johannesburg? What do recent by-elections indicate about FF+ and PA support? Is SA’s tripling growth rate enough? What is the major divide between the US and its traditional allies?

DA hot on the ANC’s heels

The latest polling by the Social Research Foundation and The Common Sense finds national support for the African National Congress (ANC) at 37%, and that for the Democratic Alliance (DA) at 32%. The numbers are premised on a 53% turnout model.

The two parties were followed by the uMkhonto weSizwe Party at 8%, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) at 7%, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) at 6%, and the Patriotic Alliance at 4%. The Freedom Front Plus (FF+) and ActionSA both registered at 2%. The survey was conducted in November 2025 among 1,002 respondents and has a margin of error of 4%.

In the competition between the top two parties, the key development to keep an eye on is support for the DA among black respondents, which was historically around 5% but has been around 15%-18% in surveys over the past year and was at 15% in this survey. Should this support be sustained into actual elections — and support among other voter groups remains sustained — then it will enable the DA to break through its traditional 25% ceiling and establish a foothold above 30%, within touching distance of the ANC.

ANC strategists will note with concern some of the other findings in the poll. When asked which political party would do the best job in certain areas, the DA came first in several categories, comfortably relegating the ANC to second place. For example:

Service delivery: DA 37.3%, ANC 15.7%
Clean governance: DA 34.9%, ANC 11.2%
Working in coalitions: DA 30.5%, ANC 16.2%
Good policies: DA 29.8%, ANC 18.2%
Good leadership: DA 31.3%, ANC 15.2%
Accountability: DA 27.9%, ANC 18.1%

When it comes to negative associations, the findings were as follows:

“Makes broken promises”: ANC 73.2%, EFF 3.9%, DA 3.3%
“Racist”: DA 33.7%, EFF 24.1%, ANC 12.9%
“Only care about themselves”: ANC 62.8%, DA 9.8%, EFF 7%
“Violent”: EFF 58.5%, ANC 13.1%, MKP 4.8%, DA 2.8%
“Anti-poor”: ANC 25.5%, DA 15.4%, EFF 13.9%, MKP 6.9%

This suggests that in campaigning for the local government elections which will take place in less than a year, the ANC might have to focus on making the racism charge stick to the DA because its cupboard is bare on other issues. That it is underperforming on positive associations and overperforming on negative associations does not bode well for its electoral prospects.

When asked whether they supported Helen Zille’s candidacy for mayor of Johannesburg, 59.6% of respondents were strongly or somewhat supportive, versus 32.5% who were somewhat or strongly opposed. Notably, even 51% of ANC-leaning respondents supported the notion of a Zille candidacy somewhat or strongly.

By-elections upswing for FF+, PA

While DA strategists will be mostly pleased with the polling results, they will find recent by-election results rather troubling. By-elections in the Western Cape and Tshwane saw notable growth for the FF+ and Patriotic Alliance (PA). Both parties are eating into DA support.

The PA took two wards from the DA in the Western Cape. In Ward 17, in George, the PA increased its vote share from 1% to 60%. The DA dropped to 38%. The turnout was 54%. GOOD and the Plaaslike Besorgde Inwoners withdrew. In Ward 27, also in George, the PA grew from 18% to 51%, beating the DA’s 49% by just 63 votes. The turnout increased to 55% from 36% and the by-election marked the PA’s third consecutive ward gain from the DA in George. Following the by-elections, the DA, FF+ and ACDP majority in the George council has decreased from 32 to 30 of the total 55 seats.

In Tshwane, while the DA held Ward 57 in Lyttelton, Centurion, its support dropped from 59% to 53%, while the FF+ grew from 16% to 44%. Turnout dropped from 50% to 21%.

SA triples its growth rates, remains a drag

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has revised its GDP growth forecast for South Africa upward: from 1.1% to 1.3% for 2025, and from 1.2% to 1.4% in 2026. The latter is in line with the South African Reserve Bank’s forecast. Last week, the bank’s governor, Lesetja Kganyago said at the World Economic Forum: “We are expecting growth of around 1.4 for this year, still modest. But it’s double the growth of the previous year.” The World Bank forecasts the South African economy to grow by 1.4% in 2026 and 1.5% in 2027. The economy grew by just 0.5% in 2024.

The IMF forecasts global GDP growth of 3.1% in 2026, while revising the number for 2025 upwards from 3% to 3.2%. The economy of sub-Saharan Africa is expected to grow by 4.6%. However, the South African economy is acting as a significant drag in the region. Excluding South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa is projected to grow at 5.5%, which would mark it as the fastest-growing region in the world.

While the slight uptick in South Africa’s growth should be welcomed, it is far from sufficient to start meaningfully reducing the country’s unemployment or raising incomes. That would require a significantly higher growth rate, which is difficult to achieve while fixed investment remains at half the global average, hampered by high levels of crime, political threats to property rights, and restrictive regulations, including race-based regulations.

Creaking geopolitical shifts in Davos

The 2026 World Economic Forum in Davos unfolded amid a palpable chill, not just from the Alpine snow, but from escalating geopolitical frictions.

At the heart of the tension was a stark divide between the United States (US) and its traditional allies, particularly the European Union and Canada. This dissonance overshadowed discussions on trade, technology, and global cooperation, revealing deep cracks in the post-World War II order.

Looking ahead, this could escalate into broader trade conflicts or NATO realignments, pushing Europe and Canada toward greater autonomy — and perhaps deepening ties with Asia — while the US risks isolation.

US officials delivered pointed critiques that amplified the event’s core tensions. The US commerce secretary, Howard Lutnick, declared that “globalisation has failed the West and the United States of America.” He described it as a “failed policy” that had harmed American workers, weakened domestic industries through offshoring and reliance on cheap global labour, and eroded economic sovereignty. Mr Lutnick framed the Trump administration’s presence at Davos as a deliberate confrontation with the old globalist consensus.

The US energy secretary, Chris Wright, offered a parallel assault on climate and energy orthodoxy. He called for doubling global oil output to meet demand reliably and affordably, while sharply criticising the “green transition” as inefficient and over-hyped. He highlighted the vast sums poured into renewable subsidies and regulations — particularly in Europe and California — with minimal tangible impact on emissions or energy security. He also downplayed climate risks by noting declines in weather-related deaths over decades and contrasted Europe’s high energy prices with the US’s deregulatory push for fossil fuels, nuclear expansion, and AI-driven growth.

Davos highlighted a geopolitics of realignment: the US betting on unilateral strength amid fragmentation, while allies grapple with diminished influence and the push toward strategic autonomy. The path forward appears one of managed rivalry rather than renewed partnership, with economic nationalism likely to intensify trade frictions and alliance strains in the coming years.

For South Africa, these dynamics expose its vulnerabilities while opening opportunities. Geopolitically, South Africa’s G20 presidency and BRICS naval drills have bolstered its ties with China and Russia to counter Western isolationism, yet have further irritated the US. Europe, feeling spurned by the US, is likely to offer South Africa’s preferred membership in the growing club of Trump victims.

Against this turbulent global backdrop, South Africa risks irrelevance. With agile policy, it could play a bridge role in a more multipolar world while positioning itself as a stable harbour in a global tempest. But to do so, it will have to bolster its declining soft power — and it cannot do so while its economy continues to underperform.