Washington plays hardball
10 February 2025: Does South Africa have an AGOA future? Can South Africa adapt its geopolitical positioning? Will MK make it to the 2026 municipal polls? Did President Ramaphosa’s SONA deliver the goods?
Welcome to the weekly Risk Alert from the Centre for Risk Analysis — 10 February 2025
Washington plays hardball
As we anticipated in the 27 January Risk Alert, “South Africa will be kept on their toes as they find themselves dealing with a far more assertive United States that is less indulgent of those opposing its core interests”. United States (US) President, Donald Trump, has not blinked in his interactions with the South African government. In typical bombastic and hyperbolic fashion, Mr Trump and his administration got their blows in early.
On Monday, Mr Trump posted that South Africa was “confiscating land, and treating certain classes of citizens VERY BADLY” on his preferred social media platform, Truth Social. He announced that he would be cutting all funding to South Africa until a full investigation had been completed.
On Tuesday, Republican Senator Ted Cruz, chairman of the Africa subcommittee on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, posted that the South African government seemed to be “going out of their way to alienate the United States and our allies”. Mr Cruz’s comments followed reporting by Reuters that the South African government had given Taiwan until the end of March to relocate the Taipei Liaison Office — the country’s de facto embassy — outside of Pretoria.
On Thursday, Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said he would not be attending the G20 summit in Johannesburg, accusing South Africa of “doing very bad things”, including expropriating private property and coddling anti-Americanism.
On Friday, Mr Trump issued an executive order instructing US departments and agencies to halt “foreign aid or assistance” to South Africa, except for “necessary or appropriate” assistance. In a move sure to rile up the African National Congress (ANC), the executive order also provides for the “resettlement of Afrikaner refugees escaping government-sponsored race-based discrimination, including racially discriminatory property confiscation”.
Contained in Mr Trump’s executive order lies the administration’s main concern: “In addition, South Africa has taken aggressive positions towards the United States and its allies, including accusing Israel, not Hamas, of genocide in the International Court of Justice, and reinvigorating its relations with Iran to develop commercial, military, and nuclear arrangements... The United States cannot support the government of South Africa’s...undermining United States foreign policy, which poses national security threats to our Nation, our allies, our African partners, and our interests.” Shifting this concern requires a mammoth diplomatic undertaking on South Africa’s part.
Given this barrage of comments and actions, it is now highly likely that South Africa’s membership of the African Growth and Opportunity Act will be revoked, and that targeted sanctions will be imposed on individuals and organisations that the US believes have directly opposed its interests — especially over Iran, Hamas and Israel. As reported in last week’s Risk Alert, there is also a chance that US investigations will reveal information about financial flows from foreign governments to the ANC, and from South Africa to designated terrorist organisations such as Hamas.
All this is casting a pall over the G20 Summit in November, which South African President Cyril Ramaphosa will have been looking forward to hosting. The G20 presidency affords the host country numerous opportunities to put forward its policy preferences and to attract capital and investment. But with the current tension between the current G20 president and his successor, that opportunity will be overshadowed by conflict.
Should Mr Ramaphosa and the country’s diplomatic establishment wish to regain the initiative, they will need to ensure they sing from the same hymn sheet, engage Mr Trump and his colleagues on the substance of their concerns, and show through their actions that the South African government is committed to removing barriers to growth, removing racially discriminatory policies, and to securing South Africans’ property rights.
The concentrated US campaign of pressure on the South African government is intended to force the issue from Washington’s side and to gauge how South Africa’s government, businesses, media and civil society react. The insights they gain will be used to inform their next steps.
Can SA pivot?
Divergent responses from Mr Ramaphosa and the minister of mineral and petroleum resources, Gwede Mantashe, to the Trump administration’s statements reflect a lack of message discipline and uncertainty regarding the South African government’s key priorities. Whatever priorities the government is pursuing in its international relations — well hidden behind a screen of buzzwords — risk being lost should the president and his ministers continue contradicting each other.
On Monday, Mr Mantashe delivered a message of defiance at the Mining Indaba in Cape Town, saying “Let’s withhold minerals from the US. If they don’t give us money, let us not give them minerals.”
In contrast, on Thursday, the presidential spokesperson, Vincent Magwenya, struck a conciliatory note, saying that South Africa would get over the current bumps and that the government hoped Mr Trump would visit South Africa ahead of the G20 summit.
South Africa’s Government of National Unity (GNU) now faces a choice between defying the US and accepting the consequences or engaging with the US and showing demonstrable movement towards accommodating some of its priorities. The Trump administration will have no patience with a South African government that wants to sit on the fence.
If Pretoria decides to defy the US, it will reinforce its ties with BRICS partners that are not aligned with the latter, primarily China. This is a consequence the Trump administration is certain to be anticipating and willing to accept, even if it is detrimental to US interests in the region. In closer alignment with China, South Africa will feel comforted and “closely held”. China has explicitly reiterated its support of South Africa’s G20 presidency.
It was always clear that Mr Trump was going to inject a high degree of uncertainty into global geopolitics and foreign policy, trade flows, and investment decisions. Businesses must prepare and equip themselves to take advantage of new opportunities that will inevitably arise when the status quo is shaken up to this great extent. Those who enjoy taking rollercoaster rides will relish the next four years; for those who do not, now is the time to tool up and adjust plans accordingly.
MK’s money troubles
Jacob Zuma’s new political home, uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK), which has attracted all the most prominent names from the Zondo state capture investigations, appears to be experiencing some internal turmoil. The former Mpumalanga convener of the party, Mary Phadi, has accused the parliamentary leader of MK, impeached former judge John Hlophe, of sexual harassment. Mr Hlophe has threatened to sue Ms Phadi over her claims, as well as Newzroom Afrika for having flighted an interview with Ms Phadi in which she made her allegation in public.
Ms Phadi was removed from her position as Mpumalanga convener in 2024 after having been accused of misappropriating funds, with party members variously claiming that R11 million, R28 million or R40 million went missing last year. Ms Phadi was replaced by the impeached former public protector, Busisiwe Mkhwebane, who had defected from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) just prior.
In the latest development, the secretary-general of MK, Floyd Shivambu — also a former EFF member — ordered the Mpumalanga leadership “to cease and desist from appointing staff with immediate effect” because of the party’s current financial situation. This was after it emerged that the provincial detachment had continued making staff appointments despite a directive not to do so.
MK appears not yet to have found a route to organisational and financial stability. If it fails in its quest to stabilise, its prospects in future political contests are weak.
The absolute state of the nation
Mr Ramaphosa’s State of the Nation Address (SONA) on Thursday evening was long on promises, but short on achievements. In this, it resembled many previous SONAs. While rhetorical nods were given to job creation and economic growth, most of the speech was a rehash of ideas that have been kicking around the government for years and have little prospect of fundamentally transforming South Africa from its low-growth trajectory. The speech started with the Freedom Charter, which underpins the National Democratic Revolution. It omitted any mention of property rights, labour market reforms, or creating enabling conditions for business to grow and investment to be attracted. Instead, the large number of grant recipients was mentioned as an achievement.
While movement on getting the private sector involved in electricity generation and freight rail was mentioned and is welcome, progress has been glacial. Much was made of money to be spent on infrastructure investment, but spending money is the easiest thing for a politician to promise and it has been promised many times before.
In summary, the president’s speech revealed a dearth of new ideas, a lacking sense of urgency about the problems the country faces, and a stolid adherence to policies that have not worked in the past. Despite the advent of the GNU era in South Africa, this was not a game-changing SONA, and Mr Ramaphosa’s wish that economic growth accelerates above 3% is unlikely to be realised.